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·e AUTHOR'S NOTE 
The information for the first part of this study, 
dealing with the foreman 1n civilian. industry, was gathered 
from interviews with public relations men connected with 
industry 1n the Boston area, letters, brochures, pamphlets, 
training manuals and programs of companies that have 
evidenced a high degree of interest in effectively utilizing 
their foremen as public relations sources, and from magazine 
articles and books dealing with the subject of the foreman 
in management. 
i 
Generally speaking, the same method of investigation 
was used 1n obtaining information dealing with the Noncommis-
sioned officer 1n the Air Force. However, there is one 
important difference that should be noted. Some of the 
information contained in this thesis comes from the author's 
own experiences and observations based on nine years of 
active duty with the United States Air Force. 
Boston, Massachusetts 
August, 1957 
ii 
INTRODUCTION 
Orders may originate 1n the office of the chairman 
of the board's office or come from the headquarters of the 
commanding general.. They may be initiated 1n the plant 
manager's office or come from the wing commander's office. 
Regardless of where they ceme from they eventually must get 
down to the people who· run a lathe or work on a jet engine. 
In both industry and in the Air Force orders and commands 
follow some sort of a chain of command. The final link 1n 
that chain, the man who gives the order to the man who is to 
do the job, is a supervisor, be he called a foreman or a 
noncommissioned officer. 
Being 1n daily face to face contact with the great 
mass of people who make up the working, productive force 
of industry or the Air Force, this supervisor is 1n a posi-
tion to do much more than merely transmit orders. Because of 
familiarity, confidence is born. Because of the authority 
vested 1n him, praise or punishment usually is initiated by 
him. Because he is 1n some mysterious way still none of the 
boys," trust and kinship is felt for him. Because of all of 
this what he says and how he says it, often has more impact 
on those directly under his supervision than anything the 
highly distant "boss" could say. True, he may not have the 
authority that the 11boss" has, but his daily dealings with 
his men puts what he says and does on a much more personal 
basis and on a level they can understand. 
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It is because of this intimate relationship tba.t there 
is such a great potential for this first line supervisor to 
act as a communicator and a public relations agent. With 
· the proper .information afforded him he understands the goals 
of' the company or the mission of his outfit. Because he 
comes closer to ·being "one of usn what· he says is more gener-
ally believed and understood. Because of his social proximity 
to the men he, in turn, can feed back to management or higher 
command what it is the men feel and want .. 
Public relations has as many definitions as there 
are practitioners in the field. If it can mean a basis for 
friendly understanding on the part of the public with whom 
you are dealing, then this first line supervisor 1n both 
industry and the Air Force is potentially the most important 
person 1n any internal public relations program. He under-
stands his public and they understand him. Perhaps he is 
not conscious of his role, or perhaps he doesn't understand 
f'ully how to fulfill his role. That is where management, 
with the aid of the public relations department, could and 
should step in and help.. However, he should be guided, not 
directed, toward a realization and fulfillment of his role 
of a communicator and public relations agent. 
CHA.PrER I 
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE FOREMAN 
During the days of the Phara<:>hs the relationship 
between the foreman, or overseer, and the worker, generally 
a slave, was treated quite simply. The worker, or slave, 
did what he was told or else the foreman, or overseer, would 
lay a whip across his back or possibly drive his spear through 
him. The solution to any misunderstandings were simple, 
direct, and often brutal. 
During the Middle Ages the lot of the serf was not 
much improved. He worked for a landlord who 1n turn had his 
overseers supervising the serf during his sun-up to sun-down 
work day. Although some of the life and death authority may 
have been removed from the overseer, basically his word was 
law to the serf. 
It is very well to be amazed at this archaic relation-
ship. However, at the beginning of the twentieth century, a 
mere five decades ago, this foreman-worker situation bad 
changed very little 1n the five thousand years since the 
Pharaohs ruled. True, the foreman did not possess life or 
death powers over the worker 1n a physical sense, but he was 
the boss and not above knocking the worker around a bit to 
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impress him with this_ fact._ He hired, :fired, and very of'ten 
decided what the worker should be pa1d.1 It still was a 
direct and simple solution to the problem. 
So many ills of modern society are blamed on the 
industrial revolution tbat it seems a -little unfair to add to 
the indictments. However, in reviewing the growth of industry 
1n this country it must be noted that industry did not gain 
momentum until a f'ew years before the Civil War and it wasn't 
until 1900 tbat industrial workers in the United States out-
numbered farm laborers and farmers. 2 
In the early days of industry 11?-: this countr~ the boss 
and his men frequently met to talk things over and iron out 
difficulties. In this environment ideas and information could 
be exchanged :freely~ Of course this is not ta imply tbat 
there were no serious problems. At the turn of the century 
the managerment-worker situation was not a healthy relationship. 
This was the era of the sweatshop. Long hours 1 unbel1eveably 
bad working conditions, low pay, and no employee benefits other 
than the paycheck prevailed. Human relations as we know it 
simply did not exist. Under such circumstances, channels of 
communications had far less significance than they do now .. 
As technological advancements were made, and competition 
increased, less and less attention was paid to the worker. He 
was merely an extension of the machine. As Christy Borth said 
in his book, True Steel, fluntil 1900 industry had not progressed 
far into the conservation of human efforte To waste labor was 
considered no waste at all.HJ 
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In time it became apparent that if one company used 
machines and another didn't, the one using the machines had a 
great competitive advantage over the non-mechanized company. 
However, when both companies used machines, success depend.~d 
on other factors. Time and motion studies were inaugurated 
and. engineers such as Frederick Taylor attempted· to bring the 
technology that had produced the machines to bear upon the 
problem of productivity. In light of his background it is 
not strange that Taylor's answer to the problem of productivity 
was more efficient 'motion on the part of the worker 1 and a 
"fair days work'' for which manage.ment would pay the worker a 
"fair day 1 s pay." The belief at the time was all the worker 
was interested in was high pay.4 
The Widening Gap 
From the turn of the century until the beginning of 
world War I labor showed signs of increasing unrest. However, 
it was World. War I with its speeded-up production and the 
generally unstable psychological atmosphere of the war years, 
that produced a rash of strikes that management could not ignore. 
Prior to the 1900's the factory worker bad been unorganized and 
management could afford to ignore him. Then, urior to 1900 
the ratio of subservient immigrant workers to the total working 
force was high and could easily be controlled. By World War I 
the labor force had swelled in numbers, and was needed badly by 
this country. Also by World War I the immigrant worker was no 
longer in the majority.5 The work~ man was raising his voice 
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1n protest and management found that it was not only unprepared 
to listen, but reluctant to change when they did listen. 
Some employers did make an attempt to resolve the prob-
lem of w0rker discontentment but lack of experience in human 
relations, early post World War I labor shortages, and a 
militant union expansion made these efforts seem futile. The 
rapid_ growth of industry had created a management group whose 
social distance from their workers was tremendous. Formerly 
the boss was a skilled technician, working with his men.. The 
growth of huge concerns continually widened the gap between 
the management group.and the worker. As the gap of common 
experiences and background widened, communication became in-
creasingly difficult. Management soon realized the necessity 
for more effective co.mmunication with the workers. Clear 
channels of communications needed to be established. This 
was no easy task.6 
Management Recognizes The Problem 
Whatever else may be said about American top management, 
never let it be said that they are not a highly intelligent 
group. True, at times they may be accused of being short-
sighted, or perhaps resistant to change, but once they 
recognized the problem of the dissatisfied worker they 
attempted to try and solve the problem of communicating with 
the worker. During the twenties and thirties greater strides 
were made toward understanding workers than possibly during 
the preceding history of man working for man. Such studies 
e. 
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as were conducted at the Hawthorne works of Western Electric, 
produced some surprising results and formalized other beliefs 
that had either been suspected or guessed at intuitively. It 
was from the Hawthorne study that Roethlisberger concluded 
that what the worker wants even more than a fat pay envelope 
is job satisfaction, acceptance by fellow workers, and to be 
t~eated as an individual. 7 In less than two decades the 
pendulum had swung from the philosophy of Taylor, who believed 
that the worker's main desire was money, to Mayo and 
Roethlisberger who espoused the cause of treating the worker 
as a human being. Industry didn 1 t have a new problem in human 
relations, it bad always existed, it was just that management 
finally recognized that the problem did indeed exist and was 
at last trying to do something about it. 
The Problem--How Management Handled It 
So far it has appeared that management generally had 
ignored the worker completely other than giving him his weekly 
paycheck. This, of course, was not the case. Some of the 
more notable exceptions to this implication are General Electric 
and western Electric which have had certain employment benefit 
plans for over forty years. DuPont, Esso Standard Oil, and 
International Harvester, just to mention a few, have had 
training programs dating back to the twenties. 8 It is true 
that these programs developed largely out of a desire to have 
more efficient production, altruism was not· a strong point in 
management, but these programs are notable 1n that they 
existed in an era when formal training programs were largely 
unknown. 
From 1900 until the present industry was also ex-
panQ.ing at a tremendous rate. The old simple relationships 
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no longer existed. The problems of simply managing became 
staggering. Whereas the foreman had formerly done the hiring, 
firing,. disciplining, and been active 1n determining how much 
a worker was to get for a day's work, this arrangement was no 
longer feasible. So here we have three factors that helped 
push the first line supervisor, the foreman, into an increas-
ingly less important role: 
1. The rise of the unions as bargaining agents for 
the -workers .. 
2. The ever increasing complexity of tildustry and 
its organization. 
J. Management's rejection of complete authoritarian 
control. 
In facing up to these situations management took a 
unilateral course of action. Personnel departments were 
organized to take care of hiring aild firing.. Rates for various 
job positions were decided upon by collective bargaining. 
Discipline became more standardized by formal methods of 
employee control. Organizationally determined policies and 
procedures further tended to replace the supervisor's freedom 
of judgment and action. Instead of a figure of authority and 
power the foreman was gradually put in thE:l position of being 
a figurehead. Although he was still held accountable as being 
the head of his particu:l.ar group of 'WOrkers' he had little 
real power to influence the situation'in which he found 
. 9 himself. Through centralized control, the foreman was by-
passed. He became the ~forgotten man." 
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I wish to emphasize ·that this situation of the foreman 
being the "forgotten man" was not universal, nor was it an 
unusual situation. The industrial-worker milieu was in a 
state of flux. The old traditional relationships no longer 
applied and new relationships were being formulated. Management 
was searching for new and better ways of satisfying the wants 
of the workers and for a while the role that the foreman was 
to play was largely ignored. In many cases management 1n 
its effort to communicate, attempted to communicate without 
really understanding. whY or what it was that they were trying 
to communicate. In a sense it had become fashionable to speak 
of the company's communication program. Programs were set 
up without realizing that each individual company had its 
individual problem and that communications programs could 
not be set up 1n production~line fash1on.10 
It wasn •t too long before management realized that 
there was something missing. Taking stock of the situation: 
revealed that while top management was attempting to communicate, 
very little real communication was going on. To the average 
l 
worker the plant superintendent, the president, and other top 
management is unreal. He finds it difficult to understand, 
to accept, and to believe that which is not quite real to him. 
He knows the foreman. He sees him every day. To the worker, 
8 
the :foreman is the company. The answer of' how to communicate 
with the worker seemed to lie 1n this temporarily forgotten 
11 man--the :foreman. 
In order for us to examine how well management bas 
succeeded in effectively utilizing the :foreman as an impertant 
communicator and internal public relations agent 1 we will 
first have to understand the role of the foreman, past, 
present, and future; what some of' his problems are, just what 
management is doing to communicate with the workers, both with 
and without the aid of the foreman, and just what the average 
worker and :foremen think of their relationship to management 
and to each other. 
With an understanding of some of the human relations 
problems, which are certainly public relations problems, we 
will attempt to analyze what steps are being taken to, ( 1) 
Increase management ts use of the foreman as a communicator, 
(2) Imp~ve the :foreman's ability to act as a communicator 
and public relations center. 
J.. 
2. 
5. 
6. 
8 .. 
J.O. 
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CHAPTER II 
TBE FOREMAN IN MANAGEMENT 
The Foreman•s Changing Role 
Management had not been totally ignorant of the 
foreman during the rapid development of human relations in 
industry during the hectic era between Worl.d War I and World 
war II, it was just that he had been momentarily by-passed. 
During the thirties industry saw violent worker unrest 1n 
the forms of the picket line, the sit-down strike, the 
boycott, and the emergence of a strong union front. During 
this period management's attention was directed toward dealing 
with the strong new unions and a more or less frantic attempt 
to communicate with the workers themselves.1 
While the management-worker relationship was gradually 
being modified ·aver the years, it is also important to note 
how the function of the foreman hB.d been modified during the 
same period. First of all, the complexity of modern industry 
has changed the old personal contact that existed between the 
foreman and the worker. More and more the foreman is forced 
to ac.t as a quarterback in:stead of a figure of .Power. Instead 
of' giving orders, he often is placed 1n the position of cajoling 
the workers to cooperate. 
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Secondly, the workers are more a~are of their strength. 
Because there is a ready market for his skill he works largely 
because of the satisfaction he derives :from his work. There-
fore, the foreman is put in the position of having to stimulate 
' ' .: ; -
a work climate that will make the worker want to produce. 
The third factor is the increase in the number of con-
tacts that a foreman has every fuiy. ·No longer does he see 
only his immediate subordinates and superior. He is forced 
to deal with his subordinates,· his superior( s) , technicians, 
staff people, other foremen, and the ever present union. 2 
Management states categorically that the foreman is 
part of management. The American Management Association says 
that "management'' means getting things done through the efforts · 
of others.J Using this as a definition, management came to 
the conclusion that they had been neglecting to use the foreman 
in a very important managerial role; that of a communicator 
of top-level managementt s thinking and as an internal public 
relations man. A:fter all, the foreman was the part of manage-
ment who dealt directly with the worker·, so why not use him as 
a face to face representative of management? .However, telling 
a person that he is part of management and getting him to feel 
that he is are· two entirely different things. Most foremen 
are not interested in the theoretical question as to whether 
they are or are not part of management. They are more inter-
ested in the actual facts; how much responsibility, how much 
authority? It is from these. actual facts that the conditions 
under which they must operate are largely determined.4 
It is interestLng to note how foremen feel about 
their position in management by looking at some statistics 
derived from a poll taken by Elmo Roper for Esso Standard 
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Oil, a company that is generally regarded as having excellent 
employee relations. Mr. Roper reports that among the super-
visors interviewed in this company's New York office, 46% of 
the supervisors felt that the company did not think of them as 
part of m.anagement.5 Of course this is only one company and 
so I certainly won•t say that such feelings are universal. 
However, it is significant that such a high percentage of 
\ 
first line supervisors in a progressive company expressed this 
opiniona From. this information I do not think it would be 
presumptuous to say that many foremen do not consider them-
selves part of management. The actual numbers involved is not 
too important. The fact management has not sold the foremen 
on this basic management concept is indicative of the failure 
on management's part to communicate. 
Problems Of The Foreman 
Perhaps one of the major problems of the foreman is 
the fact that industry bas increased at such a dizzy pace since 
1900.. The statement has been made many times .that America is 
technologically years ahead of its ability to cope psychologi-
cally with the problems that have arisen from this amazing 
technological advance. Whereas in 1900 the United States 
produced about $75 billion in goods and services (equated to 
the value of the 1956 dollar), 1n l956 it produced about 
$406 billions. 6 This growth, coupled with the changes in 
management=worker relationships already mentioned, created a 
number of problems for the foreman. 
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As industry increased_ in size more supervisors were 
needed. Often men were promoted to the position of foreman 
without really having the ability to handle the job. Normally 
his promotio~ is based on technical competence plus an estimate 
of leadership potential. All too often this ~estimaten is 
more 1n the realm of a wild guess. Mter he has been promoted, 
and displayed his shortcomings, there are two courses of 
act ion. He can either learn by trial and error, fumbling all 
the while, or he can receive formal training from management. 
Actually neither of these ex post facto techniques are desirable. 
It would be easier on the man being considered for promotion, 
the men who would serve under him, and on management to initiate 
his training before he was actually promoted and assumed his 
new duties. 7 
In order to combat this deficiency of knowing how to 
handle people, management has taken definite steps. There is 
more attention given to the selection of men who are to fill 
the position of foreman. · Mana~emen.t, realizing the importance 
of the foreman in the communications process, knows that trust 
in the source is a prerequisite to belief. If a man is promoted 
from the assembly line, which is usually the case, and he is 
not respected-and trusted, .promoting him to-foreman will not 
automatically gain him confidence from ~is fellow workers. 
Communication is difficult enough when the workers have 
confidence in the source, but.· when the confidence level is 
low 11 .communications is nearly non~xistent. 8 
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Although foremen may be considered part of management 
by management, they are only one step from being a worker. 
The average foreman is aware of this tact. One of the major 
complaints voiced by general foremen and superintendents is 
the inability of the newer foremen to identify themselves 
with management. This isn't too diff-icult to understand when 
the fact that they may be returned to the line at any time is 
considered. Because of this instability foremen are hesitant 
to "pick on anyone-" on the. line.. While top management may 
think they are communicatin€; with their foremen, middle 
management , the general foreman and the superintendent, are 
faced with production schedules and discourage questions from 
their foremen and generally adopt the attitude, "Produce or 
we will find someone who can." This only adds to the basic 
insecurity that eats at the foreman. 
The foremanrs job is difficult at best. This statement 
does not refer to the actual work, or the normal problems 
associated with his job, but to the feelings of loyalty that 
he has toward management and to the workers. The difficulty 
of his position is quite often further magnified by the nature 
of the organization under which they must operate. Guy B. Arthur 
conducted a survey of foremen for the American Management 
Association and found that 54% of the foremen survey were 
plagued with an absence of definite lines of authority, and 
70% have more thari one boss.lO such an arrangement results 
1.5 
1n confusion and further adds to the sense of insecurity 
of the foremen. 
Management normally has little difficulty 1n commuting 
downward to their :foremene There are any number of methods 
that management can employ such as meetings with the general 
foreman, newsletters, directivesa and so forth. However, there 
is a very real problem of communicating upward. In almost 
every book covering industrial communications, mention is made 
of the :fact that industrial communications is a two-way street. 
Howeveri it was discovered during the research for this paper 
that this two-way street was often a one-way street. This 
fact was brought out 1n a number of interviews with personnel 
people. In :fact one director of plant and community relations 
1n the Boston area said, 
All of the material we put out from this office 
is useless unless we know what the man on the line 
thinks. Surveys can give us a clue, but we would 
prefer to hear from the plant directly 1n a con-
tinuous flow rather than from a survey which is 
more or less a spot check. · 
The facts seem to indicate that there often is a 
serious gap 1n the upward communications program. The gap 
is created when the foreman is discou~aged :from communicating 
to his immediate superior~ In a survey conducted at one of 
the large oil companies on the ~ast coast, .53% of the :foremen 
said they did not feel free to present their grievances to 
their supervisors.ll This situation is not unique. With many 
companies that are proud of their "open door n policy upward 
communications is virtually nonexistent because the 11open door" 
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is actually a closed door. The . right of the foreman to make 
suggestions, air gri,evances, and to get explanations often 
simply does not exist,. All of the emphasis is on communicating 
downward. All. too often management is talking when it sbould 
be listening.12 · 
The ForemanAs A Communicator 
It has often been said that the foreman is 1n the 
middle, being neither management nor worker. He has also 
been accused of having to be two faced. When you examine 
how he is forced to deal with management and his subordinates, 
this accusation of being two faced is not difficult to under-
stand. Management all too often has the tendency when trying 
to communicate with the worker of using what Roethlisberger 
calls "the language of efficiency.nl2 Roethlisberger has 
invented this term to describe t.he cold factual type of 
managerial jargon that is so often used when trying to 
communicate with subordinate groups. Inherent in this type 
of language is the cold, formal, and_ highly impersonal phrase-
ology. It is not conducive to understanding other than purely 
factual materialc In the meantime, the bottom of the organiza-
tion is trying to communicate upwards with terms couched in 
sentiment and feeling,. often in the form of minor gripes that 
top management fails to understand. The crux of the whole 
matter is the social distance between the two groups. As a 
result of this social distance the same symbols do not have 
the same referents· for the two groups. Consequently neither 
understands the other very well. The supervisor is therefore . 
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placed in the unhappy position of enforcing this language of 
efficiency~ although he knows that at times it will tend to 
demoralize his subordinates~ a~d at the same time trying to 
communicate upwards the feelings and desires of his subordinates. 
It is not enough that management use the foreman to transmit 
information,from the top to the bottom in order that the 
people at the bottom understand the objectives of management., 
Indeed, it is equally important that management use the foreman 
to transmit information from bottom to top so that management 
understands and appreciates the behavior of the people at the 
bottom.13 
It is in this particular role of a communicator that 
the foreman often experiences.his most difficult and perplexing 
problems. As we shall see shortly, great strides have been 
taken to keep the foreman better informed as to exactly what 
his responsibilities are and exactly what degree of authority 
he has. .Also we shall examine the progress .made in training 
and informing the foreman. All of these steps that management 
have taken, by and large, are making the job of the foreman 
not only easier, but the foreman himself has become a more 
efficient person and serves both the worker and management 
better because of these steps. When dealing with tangibles 
the foreman of today has the benefit of staff and tecbnical 
help at his beck and call. However, when. dealing with the 
intangibles of human nature the experts aren't as available, 
and when they are, they don•t always agree. 
1.8 
For many years now management bas felt that what they 
had to say to the workers was fufinitely more important than 
- . 
what the workers had to say to management. The majority of 
the .funds expended went toward all. forms.of communications 
media--newspapers, magazines, advertisements, and posters. 
Public Relation budgets were increased and the public rela-
tions 'departments pressed to greater activities 1n telling 
management's story.l4 All of this activity is reminiscent 
of the early attempts to commUnicate with the workers just 
to be communicating. , Again it must be stressed that it is 
. . 
important that management listen before talking. By doing 
this it can aim its communicative efforts instead of blindly 
issuing reams a:rid reams of material that the workers may or 
may not be interested in. Indeed, by talking before it has 
determined the sentiments of the workers it may tend to 
alienate them when it is trying to win their favor. Manage-
ment must accept the fact that what they have to say may not 
always be more important than what the workers have to say. 
Communicating across the gap of social distance between top 
management and the average man on the line is difficult at 
best, there is no need to .. make it more difficult by doing all 
of the talking and none of the liste~1ng.l5 
Direct Communications 
It has just been mentioned that management has increased 
the amounts of money spent on communications programs with 
the workers in the last few years. Although at first glance 
any communication may appear to be better than none, there 
are certain problems that have emerged to plague both manage-
ment and the foremen. In communicating directly with the 
worker through the bulletin board, the newspaper, employee 
letter, and the like there is a very good likelihood that 
the normal lines of communication may be circumvented and 
leave the foreman in the position of finding out information 
at the same time the worker is informed. Th1s has the adverse 
effect of lowering the prestige of the foreman and certainly 
he doesn't feel much like part of management when this happens. 
Another important side effect of this direct communications 
is that the worker's confidence 1n their foreman can easily 
be shaken. If a change in policy, a new operating procedure, 
or plans to have an open_house is announced through the plant 
newspaper or the bulletin board without first informing the 
foreman, workers coming to him for additional information or 
clarification are going to discover that he knows no more 
about it than they do. Such answers as, "I don 1 t know any 
more than you do." Or 1 "It's news to me," reduces the con~ 
fidence level of the workers in their foreman. The ~ediate 
effect of such a happening probably won't be apparent, but 
it is a bit difficult to expect the workers to have confidence 
1n distant, unreal top management when they have none 1n the 
man they see everyday, their foreman.15 
Another devastating effect of an all out attempt to 
communicate with the worker might be called the "backfire 
effect." Management in its concern for communicating with 
the worker may overdo the job. Everytime the worker turns 
around he is being given another announcement. The bulletin 
board, the public address system, pay envelope inserts, 
personal letters from the president, all add up to a deluge 
of paper tbat may result in "cellulose indigestion. n He is 
bombarded with so much information tbat he rebels and either 
refuses to read what is presented to him or reads it. and 
ignores what he reads.l6 
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This "backfire effect" is more dangerous than it 
appears on the surface. The implications are much more serious 
than merely having the communicative efforts of management 
wasted. If the employee doesn't read information from manage-
ment, or reads it and discounts it, he will get his information 
from some other source.,. FUrthermore, there is much evidence 
that workers do not believe not because they don't know, 
but because there is a tendency for the workers to be against 
management, per se. Possibly because of their increased 
social awareness, their increased mobility, and the- feeling 
of strength as a result of increased unionization, a feeli:ng 
of hostility, or at least suspicion, of management's motives 
exists among workers. It is impossible to combat this feeling 
by simply putting out fancier plant papers, technicolored 
movies, or multi-colored posters.. Confidence in management 
must be built not only by act ions of management, but by a 
more careful screening of information given to the workers 
so that they feel that the information is important and has 
been given careful consideration.· Attention to bot<T this 
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information is transmitted must also be considered. Workers 
all too often have the feeling that the mass production 
methods of bulletin boards~ posters$ and so on show very 
little care on the part of management. If management doesn •t 
think the information is important enough to warrant care and 
consideration, why should the worker? 
Believing The Foreman 
Because management thinks of the foreman as part of 
management, and also because workers and foremen alike feel 
that the foreman is either part of, or closely connected to, 
management 1 this feeling of hostility of the workers toward 
management is especially serious~ Because of this feeling 
of hostility and lack of confidence toward management, and 
consequently the foreman to a lesser degree, the utilization 
of the foreman as a communications center can be seriously 
hampered because source credibility and confidence are important 
in acceptance. In a survey conducted by the American Management 
Association, and reported in their special report 181 of their 
General Management Series, what the worker thought of American 
management was both startling and paradoxical. It was found 
that 40% of the workers thought that management was doing an 
excellent job of running business and an additional 42.% eon-
ceded management did a good job. So we have 82% of the workers 
expressing a relatively high degree of satisfaction and confi-
dence in management as managers.. However, when asked how well 
they thought management understood and treated the employees, 
i.e., fair share of the profits, fair promotion system, and 
fair treatment of the unions, the results were less than 
flattering. On the average, only 45% of the employees felt 
that management treated them fairly and understood them. 
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In addition to these unflattering .figures, when asked which 
had done the most to advance their standards of living, the 
following figures represented a serious failure in the commu-
nications efforts of management. 
UnionLeaders--------------- 47% 
Business Leaders------------ 18% 
·Government Leaders---------- 18% 
All three------------------- 5% " 
No Opinion------------------ 12%17 
This lack of confidence represents a very real barrier 
in the communicative process. Management has displayed 
remarkable intelligence and skill in researc~ the market 
for their products.. American advertising is a wonder to the 
rest of the world in the success it has achieved. Yet, all 
too often it has neglected to do any thorough research within 
the walls of their own plants to determine how their workers 
think and what they want.. They attempt to communicate without 
first defining what their market is really like. The foreman 
is like a salesmanjl but a salesman whose company has done an 
ineffective market research job. Because of .this he is quite 
often aware of what he must sell, but the buyer's resistance 
is too great .18 
2.3 
The problems that have been listed which confront 
both management and the foreman are not intended to be taken 
as historical problems, but rather contemporary problems that 
are being met everyday in the industrial field.. Although 
these problems are complex and ever changing, they are not 
insurmountable. The very fact that top management is aware 
that internal communications problems exist would be a steu 
in the right direction. However, management is more than 
merely aware of these problems, they are trying to do some-
thing about them. Such organizations as the American Management 
Assoc1ation 1 The Foremen's Institute, The Institute For Indus-
trial Studiesj and other groups that are seriously studying 
the problems of industry, are daily contributing to the und~r­
atanding of the worker-management relation and the problems 
associated with such relations. In addition to these private 
groups, colleges and universities throughout the nation are 
spending more ·and more time trying to solve some of these 
problems •. 
In the next portion of this thesis we shall investigate 
some of the programs that are being- taken to make the foreman 
a more effective member of the management group and also dis-
cover how management is attempting to utilize the foreman as 
a communications and public relations center. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE DYNAMICS OF FOREMANSHIP 
Taking things in their logical sequence let us examine 
how management has changed their concept o~ who will make a 
good foreman and how they are selected. As was mentioned Pl.-
the brie~ history o~ industrial practices through the years 
at the beginning of this study, ~oremen were ~ormerly selected 
on the basis of two criteria: technical competence and 
ability to keep the men in line. Tecbnical competence is 
still weighted heavily in the selection of foremen, for their 
main ~unction is production. However, mere production is 
no longer the basic criteria. As E. B. Roberts, Assistant 
to the Vice-President o~ Westinghouse, says, "The.~oreman's 
task is not merely to get things done, but· to get them done 
harmoniously .. nl This means that first o~ all the ~oreman must 
inform his workers. If he is to inform his workers it follows 
that the foreman himself must be better informeda He must 
not only understand what is to be done, he must possess the 
ability to impart this in~ormation to his subordinates. 
Selecting The Foreman 
More scientific methods are now generally employed by 
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most companies in the initiai selection of foreman than merely 
determining who is a good t echnicia:rl and .wbo in the shop can 
"handle" the men. It is not felt that a detailed discussion 
of supervisory selection is germane to a public relations 
study. However, some particularly good articles on trends in 
supervisory selection may be found in the general management 
series of the American Management Association. The very fact 
that management is taking ·more care in the selection of its 
supervisors is good communicatio:q.s and public relations 
practice in itself for it shows the workers that management 
is interested enough to select the best qualified men for 
supervisory positions~ This concern on the part of management 
of selecting the best qualified men for supervisory positions 
makes the workers feel that management is treating them 
"right. n2 
Training The Foreman 
Although improved techniques of foreman selection are 
important, it is in the field of foreman training that the 
most vis able signs of progress in utilizing the foreman as a 
communications center have been made. Management has come to 
recognize the fact that the foreman does not ordinarily enter 
into his position possessing the skills and knowledge necessary 
to cope with the complex requirements of his job. True, he 
may be, quite competent technically but as we have seen, 
management is interested in more than technical competence 
in the present day foreman. To be able to manage men, to 
e. foster a. spirit of cooperation, to be able to communicate 
takes additional training •. 
Esso Standard Oil .is an example of. a company that 
has realized that foreman. training in the human relations 
field is necessary in order for the foreman to effectively 
cope with the complex demands of his position in modern 
industry. Esso has established a main training center at 
their Elizabeth, New Jersey plant where courses in human 
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relations are offered to their new supervisors. These courses 
are offered in addition to the tralriing courses offered at 
their local plants. These courses are typical of those offered 
by many companies as a realization of the importance of two 
way communications.3 
6. 
Teamwork of Management 
Tools of Management 
Giving Orders __ 
Inducting New Employees 
Planning and Leading 
Meetings· 
How to Talk to Workers 
7 ~ Developing Desirable 
Worker Attitudes 
8. Dealing with Union 
Representatives 
9. Employee Ratings 
Handling Job 
Relations 
In viewing these courses t it mlist be understood that 
although these represent those offered by a particular 
company, they are not unique for they represent the general 
philosophy of management today. In order to bolster this 
statement, let us examine a statement contained in a manual 
put out by General Electric. 
If the communication program is to be successful 
1n developing mutual trust, ·respect 3 confidence, 
understanding and loyalty throughout the unit, it 
must employ media capable of transmitting not only 
information, but also feeling. The results we seek 
are more emotional than logical, and the manner in 
which the information is presented is, therefore, 
of eqWl importance with the nature of the informa-
.tion. 
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The very fact. that such a statement in a manual issued 
by one of the largest corporations in the United States does 
not elicit so much as a raised eyebrow is an effective commen-
tary on how management •s thinking has changed in the last 
twenty years. 
Management has also graduated from the rtdo it yourself" 
school of communications. As we have seen in the early days 
of the awakening of management to the human relations problems, 
many false steps were t~en and many companies initiated commu-
nications programs just to be communicating. As an example of 
how management today makes use of specialists in the field of 
human relations, communications, and puolic relations in training 
their managers all the way from the foreman on up, let us 
examine the program that International Harvester has developed 
to establish criteria for training their managers. 
During world War II International Harvester, as almost 
every other industrial organization, experienced a tremendous 
growth, accompanied by the usual growing pains. During the 
press of national emergency. many· shortcomings had to be over-
looked; "make don was the motto, not only at International 
Harvester but in industry at large. However, after the war 
reorganizing and taking stock was the order of the day. 
Late in 1945 three major steps were taken by Inter-
national Harvester. They set up a ·central school in Chicago 
for managerial training, thereby consolidating the many varied 
and scattered schools and programs. They acquired buildings 
to house this central school. The third step was unique and 
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has since been followed by_ many industrial concerns. 
International Harvester entered into a five year working 
agrE?ement with the University of Chicago whereby the facUlties. 
of the University were available to the company in order to 
_help establish educational objectives, develop educational 
methods, and to measUre the achievements of the program.5 
Significant as the step to establish such a school 
to train its managerial staff is, perhaps the really important 
factor is to be found in the evaluation as to w& certain 
human relation courses should be taught to management at all 
levels--including the foreman. A committee of foremen, working 
in. conjunction with the Education and Training division of 
. International Harvester, drew up a list of more than fifty 
problems tbat can and frequently do confront foremen during 
the course of a day •. Rather than design a course to treat 
each problem so that the foremen would have ready-made 
*'company answers" for each situation, the committee decided 
that. what the foremen needed was some basic information that 
' 
would help him solve each problem as it arose. Accordingly 
the fifty_ odd problems were b_roken down into four basic areas: 
Personal Development~ This includes effective speaking, 
letter writing, planning and organizing, and logical thinking ... 
Human Relations. Human behavior, industrial relations, 
the foreman as a member of management. 
Economics. The competitive system, laws of economics, 
Harvester's financial structure. 
Company Operations. Policy development and application, 
supply and inventory, product distribution, employee 
information program.6 
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One highly interesting aspect of this training program 
was that the trainees were often unable to :perceive their 
own weak areas and consequently could see little need for the 
training. Here the judgment of the people at the next highest 
level and the next lowest level aided considerably in spot-
lighting the weak areas of the person concerned. Whereas 
neither the idea of cooperating with a university or using 
subordinate levels to help evaluate superiors is considered 
new today, it is important to realize that management was con-
cerned enough to establish such programs that are taken for 
granted today. 
Perhaps the second most frequently heard word in human 
relations today is participation; communications has been 
heard so often that it easily wins as number one. But, 
participation is important and is being used to make employees 
feel that they are a part of the training and communications 
programs rather than merely being subjected to them. 
At International Harvester committees of trainees 
evaluate, suggest changes, and define needs of the training 
programs in which they participate. Many managers in the past 
have felt that they knew what was best for their employees. 
It has been discovered that supervisors often· have a real 
desire to learn and know from experience where they are weak. 
By listening to their ideas and expressions of wants, the 
training and education division of a company can often obtain 
31 
vaiuable information to guide them in establishing a training 
program. Such procedures are a far cry from the "Training 
Staff Meeting" as reported in Dubin's book.7 
General Electric, also keenly aware of the problems 
of a new supervisor, have instituted, among their many other 
continuing traintng periods for all supervisors, the so-called 
supervisors • 11Vestibule Course .. " This is roughly a forty 
hour course that was designed specifically for the new, or 
about to be, foreman. Roughly the same type of courses as 
mentioned in the discussion of International Harvester's 
program are given, i.e., basic company procedures, union 
:relations, and human relations. Although it is difficult to 
imagine that all of the questions of the new foreman would be 
answered by such a course (it is not intended to do this) 
such a course certainly aids in getting the new foreman 
started on the right foot and is invaluable as a motivational 
tool for managemente 
Training programs are varied, as they should be. 
Each company is different, each has different problems, and 
therefore each sbould have a training program geared to best 
serve their own specific needs.. The one really encouraging 
factor, especially to a person in public relations, is the 
attention given by all of the programs to human relations. 
Actual training programs are but one segment of what 
mlght be called the "new look" in .industry's treatment of the 
foreman. One of the most important and most used type of 
intra-management communications is the foreman's conference. 
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Let it be understood tbat there are many. different names and 
varying procedures followed .in t~is type of meeting, but the 
ends are the same in each. case' to. inform the foreman. 
In a survey conducted by the American Management 
Associatio'n 1 almost 80% of the companies replying stated that 
they held regular meetings .with their foremen. It was felt 
that certain specific -advantages· were. gained because of these 
meet1Ilgs .. 
1. ImRroved Job Efficiency: (of the foremen) 
Foremen get information sooner and get it straight from top 
management, thus eliminating several steps 1n the transmission 
process.. This not only speeds. up the process but also eliminates 
the :filtering ef:fect that characterizes many step transmission 
of information. Also in a meeting questions can be asked to 
clear up any mis-understandings. 
2. Improved Employee Relations: By going to meetings 
themselves they get used to meetings and are more prone to 
hold meetings among their subordinates. By having these 
in:formation conferences they gain first-!>.and information that 
they 1n turn can impart to the worker duriilg their monthly 
meetings. The information disseminated by the foremen has 
two advantages, ~t is accurate and employees appreciate hearing 
first hand information from management through their foreman 
(increasing his prestige). 
). Better Intramanagement Understanding: Although 
the meetings are designed specifically to discuss and impart 
information, the meetings allow different levels of management 
to meet and become better acqua~ted with one another's 
problems. 
4. Improved and Uniform Reception: Because the 
foremen are all together and hear the news and questions 
pertaining to it, effective reception and uniformity of 
reception is enhanced.8 
It is all very well for management to communicate 
with the foremen, but if the transmission stops there and 
does not reach the workers, the effort has largely been 
wasted~ There is evidence that there is still much to be 
desired in the foreman as a communicator. 
Evaluating The Foreman 
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In a poll taken by Opinion Research Corporation in 
1952 of a random sample of 655 employees at three International 
Harvester plants, it was found that the foreman was not 
communicating as well as he might. One of the questions asked 
was, ''Does your foreman ever pass on information about the 
company?" In plant A, 37% said yes. In plant B, 41% said yes. 
In plant C, 52% said yes. These figures are not at all 
flattering but become even less so when the information that 
the foremen were credited with giving was discovered to be 
largely of the on-the-job-routine nature.9 A follow-up 
study was made to discover why this situation existed and it 
was found that it apparently stemmed from the fact that 
foremen were reluctant to initiate discussion on their own. 
Two major reasons were given for this failure to initiate 
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communications.. The foremen dian' t completely understand 
the necessity of communicating, and secondly was the lack of 
knowledge of how 'to initiate discussion. lt is because o:f 
this lack of confidence in initiating discussions and the 
generally low communications effectiveness of foremen that 
so much emphasis is placed on such subjects as public speaking~ 
conference leader techniques, and other group dynamic subjects 
1n the training courses for, foremen. 
The duPont Company was also aware of this failure of 
the foreman to communicate. Now they train their foremen in 
discussion techniques-e The idea is that these men have the 
basic qualifications for communicating together, all they need 
is a little help. They have, generally speaking,. the same 
background, the same job experiences, and are around each 
other all day long. This certainly is a good basis for 
starting communications. The results of this experiment have 
been most gratifying. Reports show that as the result of 
such training the :foremen find that their regular meetings 
are :far more efficient and productive of useful ideas. It 
has also been noted that the esprit de corps seems to be 
favorably influenced by this spirit of participating in a 
meeting rather than attending a meeting. 
One other important feature of this discussion type 
meeting is the opportunity for instantaneous feedback, 
especially after the meetings have been going on for a while 
and the natural reserve of the participants is broken down. 
This feedback is more complete and faster than that experienced 
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with written communications and it helps reduce the "snowfall 
of paper." 
At one time it was thought that 1n order to inform 
your employees' all you had to do was tell your supervisors 
and the information would automatically be transmitted down 
the line to the worker. There are a variety of reasons why 
this isn 1t necessarily so •. Perhaps;the most common reason 
is that foremen are not ·inherently good communicators. 
Communications is an art·,: and foremen like most people don't 
know too much about it. Also, there are foremen who believe 
that knowledge is power and refuse to tell their workers any-
more than they need to lmow in order to perform their job. 
Of course there are those who are tttoo busy" to inform the 
worker. When management starts to consider how well their 
foremen communicate, as well as how well they run the technical 
end of the business, then, and only then, will the foreman 
truly become the most important link in the communication 
chain. This is no far fetched hope. As an example, Generalc 
Electric has what is called a · Peri.odic Performance Appraisal 
For Management Personnel. In this extensive appraisal booklet, 
some fifteen pages counting the ilistructions, the very first 
section deals with1 "Responsibility for Personnel" and listed 
below are the questions. I do not believe it unfair to say 
that these questions would not have been used say ten or 
fifteen years ago. 
How Well Does He: 
1. Instill "team spirit" in his organization? 
2. Exercise firm (and fair) leadership 
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3. Appraise and develop subordinates for promotion 
from within 
4. Exercise discipline 
5. Interpret and apply fair compensation policies 
6. Work through his'people to accomplish objectives 
7• Maintain two-way communications through his 
organization 
8. Back up the decisions of his people 
9. Stimulate his people to think for themselves 
10. .Let his people know what is expected of them 
11. Inspire, in the minds. o·f his people, confidence 
in his leadership, and hiB ability to succeed in 
spite of difficulties. 
Management is aware that face to face communi cat ion 
is far superior to any written communication. It is because 
of this realization that so mu.ch emphasis is placed on first, 
training and informing the foreman and secondly, getting the 
foreman to hold meetings with his subordinates.. These two 
major steps may be called "Integrating and Motivating the 
Management Team," as it is at General Electric, or "Work 
Smarter Program" as it is called at Johns=1·1anville 1 or any 
number of other "trade" names. What they are called is 
unimportant. It is important that management is trying to 
reduce statistics that show that foremen not only don1 t 
initiate discussion in many cases, but they actually discourage 
discussion and suggestions. 
Communicating To The Foreman 
We have seen how management today takes more care in 
selecting and training their foremen. The program certainly 
doesn't stop there. Efforts to keep the foremen informed 
and motivated have been just as herculian as in selecting and 
training. 
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Raymond Peters conducted a survey 1n an attempt to 
discover what types of 1ntramanagement communications were 
most frequently used.10 These are the results based on twenty-
two companies answering;· 
Method 
Chain of Command meetings 
Foremen conferences 
Bulletins and newsletters. 
Personal letters 
Supervisors manuals 
Counseling 
Characteristics of IVIetbods Employed 
%using 
100 
96 
68 
68 
50 
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Chain of Command Meetings: Department heads hold 
meetings with their subordinates who in turn hold meetings 
with their immediate subordinates and so on down the line. 
Although this is essentially a "face-to-face" meeting informa-
tion may become distorted because of the several levels between 
the initiating level and the final recipiant. 
Foremen Conference: These may be held on a vertical 
or horizontal basis. This type of' meeting provides for a 
variety of subjects that can be discussed allowing foremen 
to be exposed to other department heads so they may become 
aware of problems other than their own.. This type of meeting 
is conducive to participation and quick undistorted two-way 
communication.. However, _if not conducted properly there is 
a possibility of the foremen "freezing-up n if there is too 
much "brassn present. 
Bulletins. and Newsletters: This leads to the personal 
touch and makes the foreman reel he is truly part of management. 
Unless there is some method of follow-up there is little 
feedback and as a result very little two-way communica~ion. 
Personal Letters: Roughly the same as the bulletin 
and newsletter technique. 
38 
Supervisor's Manuals: There is probably a wider range 
of possibilities with this method than any other. A well 
thought out, well written manual can be a tremendous success 
whereas a poor one can be o£ little or no help. 
Counseling: This is a relatively new, and as yet, not 
too frequently used method of helping the foreman. Foremen 
are just as susceptible to problems as any worker~ perhaps 
more so considering the pressure under which they must work. 
If conducted properly by fully competent people, this can be 
a very successful tool in helping the foreman solve his 
personal problems, problems that may affect his ability to 
function as a supervisor. 
· In emphasizing the personal face-to-face contact 
type of communications, the permanent written aids to the 
foremen should not be overlooked. Many companies that spend 
a great deal of money on educational programs have overlooked 
an excellent means of communications by neglecting to have a 
foreman's manual. A well written, carefully thought out manual 
can do much to help the foreman perfoim his day to day tasks. 
Such information as responsibilities, rate setting, grieve.nce 
procedure, discipline practices, seniority system, vacation 
policies, and other more or less routine matters, if written 
clearly and concisely and contained in a personal manual, can 
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afford a ready reference for questions asked the foreman. By 
being able to answer the questions of his subordinates without 
ba.ving to run to the general foreman for answers, the foreman 
not only speeds up the flow of information, but the employee t s . 
confidence in him is raised, thus enhancing the foreman as 
an information source with high credibility. 
Foremen And Unions . 
To. the average fo~eman there are two very important 
people he must deal with quite frequently; his immediate superior 
and the union steward. In the past the foreman was pretty much 
ignored when a new contract was being negotiated between the 
company and the union. By ignoring the foreman the company 
left him pretty much to his own devices if he wanted to find 
out anything about the conditions that were going to govern 
the worker-management situation during the life of the contract. 
Since he is the first line supervisor who is going to have to 
deal with the union member (the worker on the line) this is a 
serious oversight. In a poll conducted by Elmo Roper at a 
large East coast company 6J% of the foremen expressed the opinion 
that they were insufficiently informed about collective 
bargaining .11 Since management claims that the foreman is 
part of management, he should be treated as part of management. 
The foreman should be con.sulted before the contract is signed 
and receive elaboration on any points on which he may be 
confused or insufficiently informed. The foreman is the 
person who is going to have to live with any contract that is 
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signed, tell him what he is going to have to live with.12 
In almost any management magazine you will find an 
article deal~g with some phase of union relationship. There 
is almost a phobia among top management about expla~ing the 
"American free enterprise system" to the rank and file worker. 
One very good article describing this phobia can be found in 
the 1950 summer issue of Fortune by William H. Whyte called, 
"Is Anybody Listening?" The basic issue seems to be however, 
that unions sometimes do make certa~ claims that management 
feels obligated to answer or management may want to explain 
its own actions and motives to the workere Mr. Whyte calls 
this competition for the worker's loyalty "The Big Sell~" 
By informing the foreman fully about.the motives and objectives 
of the company, management includes the foreman as a basic 
part of management and assures itself that the foreman will 
be able to present the views of management ~ a clear and 
undistorted manner to the worker. One example of this is the 
weekly newsletter issued to the foremen at International 
Harvester.. Company plans, reasons for certain actions, and 
objectives are included ~ this newsletter to the foremen. 
The foremen not only get their information first hand, and 
before the workers do, but they ~ turn are able to answer 
questions and disseminate information that might very possibly 
stop rumors before they can develop into sources of trouble. 
Such actions on management 1 s part as ~eluding foremen ~ on 
collective bargainlng and informing foremen quickly and 
completely 1 is an important step 1n the communications function 
that the foreman is playing with increas 1ng importance 1n 
the everyday industrial picture. 
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The basic pattern for a successful· communicatio~ 
program is flexibility. It was mentioned before that 
communications programs cannot be successfully mass produced, 
and it bears repeating. It follows that although the foreman 
is an important link in the communications process, there are 
other methods of communicating with the worker. However, it 
must be understood that by communicating directly with the 
workers caution should be exercised so that the foreman is 
not flagrantly circumvented_and thereby placed in an embar-
rassing position. 
Companies today are spending more and more on employee 
publications, informational literature, and opinion polls. 
Employee meeting..:s of all kinds are on the increase. The 
adva.ntages:.are obvious·, the pitfalls not so obvious. The 
advantages are quick transmission of information to large 
groups-of people and uniformity of information. However, ~uch 
methods, particularly group meetings, . do have certain disad-
vantages. Mass meetings cost money in terms of lost production 
time and if they ·are not handled skillfully more damage than 
good can be accomplished and 1n all types of direct communica-
tion there is the chance of by-passing the proper lLnes of 
communication. You must never·lose sight of the feelings, 
morale, and proper utilization of the people between top 
management and the line. 
One answer to this problem has been found. and. 
successfully utilized. by a number of companies. A committee 
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of union representatives, people from personnel, foremen, and 
office supervisors inform top management what kind of informa-
tion the workers want. Specific problems, rumors, or general 
company objectives are just a few of the possible topics 
suggested-. Management then arranges meetings with selected 
participants from all levels in the company •. The particular 
subjects are discussed and a question and answer period follows. 
Minutes from the meetings are then sent out to the homes of 
all of the workers.l3 
Foreman Prestige 
Earlier we discussed whether or· not the foreman was 
part of management. we discovered. that management almost 
without exception has declared that the foreman is part of 
management~ However, we have also discovered that there is 
still considerable doubt in a good many foremen's minds as 
to whether they actually are part of management. The old 
cliche, "Actions speak laude~ than words," might very properly 
be applied in the foreman's case.. If management is going to 
use the foreman as part of management he should also be treated 
as part of management.· Such actions are just as real communica-
tions and. public relations as any manual, publication, or 
personal letter from the president. If QY actions management 
can align. the foreman with management he will not only be an 
abler communicator, he will be a more willing one .. 
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Since the foreman is supposed to be part of management· 
provide him with signs of office. A private telephone, paid 
in the same manner as other managers and at a rate commensurate 
with his position. He should not have _to punch a time clock, 
unless the rest of the management does. Give him a desk, even 
if he doesn 1t USe it much it iS ac Sign of hiS position. SUCh 
outward physical signs are just as important in communicating 
with the foreman as the foreman•s manu-al, conferences, bulletins, 
and visits to other departments. The ground must be plowed 
before the seed can be planted .. 
One of the more important aspects of communicat 1ng 
with the foreman has only been touched on in this paper. 
How to improve relations and establish effective upward 
communications with the· foreman's immediate supervisor? 
The big m~ss of managers called middle management constitute 
the largest number and greatest span in levels of authority. 
If this group of people is not sold on an idea, going either 
up or down, the idea or plan is doomed. This group is the 
"filter•• through which communications both up and down must 
pass~ More attention should be paid to the relationship of 
the foremen to this group. To think that the foreman is the 
most important single link between top management and the 
worker is correct unless this nebulous middle group is con-
sidered as a single group. If they are, they then become 
more important. If the foreman is treated more like a member 
of management the relationship is certain to improve. Under-
standing and trust are the first prerequisites to communications 
and good internal public relations. 
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Coordinating The Program 
If utilizing the foreman as a communicator and public ._ 
relations agent is a valid function of his position, and there 
is little reason to doubt that it is, help in the form of 
formal training is, of course, necessary. But coordination 
with the public relations department is also an important 
factor. External public relations is just one function of 
any company's public relations programe As has been demon-
strated management is vitally concerned with internal communi-
cations and public relations. In order to have an integrated 
internal public relations program the public relations department 
should aid in the formal training of the foreman by helping 
to determine course content and it should also enlist the help 
of the foreman in furthering programs initiated within the 
company. After all, it is from t.he foreman that. the worker 
gets a great deal of his information. By listening to the 
foreman the public relations department can more readily 
determine the sentiments of the worker and adjust their program 
to conform to the prevailing situation. By telling the fore-
man the purpose of the program the foreman is in a better 
position to help the public relations department put their 
program across. 
If the foreman is to communicate he must have something 
to communicate. Ie he is to be management's public relations 
link with the worker he must know what to do 1n order to 
help implement the program. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER AND HISTORY 
Prior To World War II 
Certainly the oldest profession, ribald remarks not 
withstanding, is that of' the soldier$ It is unfortunate, 
but true, that men in their relations with other men have 
s.een fit to settle their dif'f'erences, both real and imagined, 
by the use of' arms. The soldier throughout history has 
either been on the top of' the social scale, or on the bottom, 
depending on the prevailing social system from which he sprang. 
In our western civilization the military system has 
been a faithf'ul extension of tne social system behind it. 
From the serf-landlord relationship came the officer-soldier 
relationship. The officer was the rich, strong, and educated 
person who was accustomed to being served. The soldier was 
the serf; poor, ignorant, and weak, used to serving. The 
social servitude in civilian life was no different in the 
military life. Indeed, in the army the serf was often better 
off, for in the army he had a.fair chance of being fed and 
clothed, something that he wasn•t so sure of in the landlord-
serf' relationship. 
47 
In European countries there is a background of 
landlord-serf relationship and regardless of the present 
republican, democratic, or parliamentary form of government 
there is a history of the serving and those served. The 
United States has had no such background of an aristocracy 
and yet here we find a contradiction. The very basis for our 
military thinking, until quite recently, followed the conven-
tional landlord-serf relationship~ Discipline and custom 
dictated that even in the military system of the United 
States the officer was to be served and the enlisted man was 
to serve. Therefore we have the paradox of a nation that 
never had a ruling class developing a military system that 
was completely foreign to the social system surrounding_ it. 
Actually there were many reasons for this paradox. 
When our armed forces were first formed dUring revolutionary 
days the ways and manners of foreign armies were slavishly 
copied and consequently there developed, through custom as 
much as anything, a military system that had its foundations 
in Europe, not America. 
Then we have what might be termed a double paradox. 
Historically the United states has never been a militaristically 
inclined. nation and consequently, except for times of national 
emergencies, our armed forces have been quite small. This 
very smallness created a clannish attitude among those in the 
service and because of this clannish attitude those who served 
in the military were anxious to emmulate what they considered 
the best of the older and larger armies of Europe. Furthermore, 
this standing armed force was called upon to act as a cadre 
for the training of civilians who were pressed into service 
during times of national crises and since strict obedience 
and discipline are necessary under combat conditions, this 
cadre maintained a rigid discipline system at all times. 
The noncommissioned officer (NCO) has always played 
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an important role in the armed forces. .However, before 
continuing the discussion of the NCO perhaps it would be best 
to defirie just what a NCO is. ·According to the United States 
Air Force's concept, a NCO is one of the top three enlisted 
grades (corresponding to the old ranks of staff s-ergeant, 
technical sergeant, and master sergeant). Prior to this 
definition the NCO was anyone with the rank of corporal 
through master sergeant. The reason that the NCO has always 
played such an important role is he is the link between the 
officer and the enlisted man. The reason for his existence 
comes about because the officer finds it impossible to 
effectively handle the large number of enlisted men under his 
command~ Today we know this concept as the span of control. 
By breaking the large mass of enlisted men into smaller 
groups, and establishing a hierarchy through which control 
can be exerted, the officer can maintain. control. This 
hierarchY consists of a .group of leaders termed noncommissioned 
officers. 
In armies characterized by strict military discipline 
not only is the officer treated with ram-rod military courtesy, 
so is the NCO. Examples of this can be found in our own times. 
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The German army, largely as a result of the Prussian influence, 
was a very militaristic and authoritarian organization. In 
the German army the NCO rated a call to attention when he 
entered a room in which there were subordinates of his, and 
when a private addressed a sergeant in the German army he 
addressed him as Herr Sergeant. Along with the respect the 
Ger~an NCO received there were many privileges and other 
special treatments to enhance his prestige and more firmly 
establish his vis able authority. 
The NCO in the United States bas never been treated 
so nearly like an. officer as ha? his German counterpart. 
However, in times past he has been a very powerful person in 
the military ranks.. 1Uong with the obvious badges of rank, 
such as cheverons and higher, pay, the NCO often bad special 
mess halls, relief from the more menial details, special 
living quarters 1 an.~ a great deal of latitude in direct 
discipline. Except for serious ot:fens es, the officer in 
charge expected his NCO to handle whatever disciplinary prob-
lems as might arise as he saw fit. Indeed., the concept of 
the tough old first sergeant was not evolved from pure fiction. 
The general acceptance of the NCO as a person of 
prestige and power among the armed forces is perhaps easier 
to understand when the pre-World War II army is more closely 
examined.. By in large the military, both officer and enlisted 
corps, was composed of professionals~ · The man who had less 
·than ten years of service was considered a "rookie." All in 
all the pre-World War II army was a pretty static organization. 
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Promotions came slowly and competition for the few vacancies 
was keen.. When a man was promoted he had had time to demon-
strate his ability and 1n the eyes of his peers had 11 earned'1 
his promotiono He was a known quantity, not only 1n the eyes 
of his officers, but 1ri the eyes of his comrades 1n the 
enlisted ranks as well. 
Human relations in this army were no especial problem 
because, as 1n industry, they simply werentt recognized as 
problemse You .either conformed and complied or suffered the 
consequences. Normally speaking this conforming and complying 
was more or ·less expected because the men 1n the service were 
there of their own volition.. Finally, much of the discipline 
and many of the special privileges were grouped under the 
heading of RHIP; rank has its privileges. This was the 
accepted philosophy and if it wasn•t generallz accepted it 
made little difference because it was accepted by those 
officers and NC0 1 s who determined that it would be the pre-
vailing philosophy .. 
As was pointed out in our discussion of the foreman, 
saying that a man, by virtue of his position, has certain 
responsibilities and commensurate authority, and actually 
investing him wi.th these responsibilities and authorities are· 
two different things. The pre-World War II NCO had plenty of 
»paper" responsibility and authority and an equal amount of 
"real" responsibility and authority. Because he had been 
promoted slowly and demonstrated his ability, and the teclmo-
logical requirements were relatively simple, his commanding 
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officer unhestiatingly delegated a great many responsibiliti~s 
and a great deal of authority to his NCO. · 
So we have_ the pre-World War II NCO existing in a very 
homogeneous group, with fairly simple technologica3:- problems 
in comparison wit4 today's, with a great deal of authority, 
~d a tremendous amount of prestige because of rules and 
regulations (legal prestige) and earned presti-ge because of 
his job lmowledge and the confidence expressed in him by his 
officers,; What happened to this situation during, and imme-
diately following .World War II, shall now be examined. 
. . . 
The Effects of world War II --
Between 'september 1939 and May 1945, the Army expanded 
:from its static.peace time strength of ·200,000 to more tban 
8,000 ,000.. This forty-fold increase in strength was accomplished 
by the induction of civilian~. Civilians, who by in large, 
were unused to, and objected to the restrictions that Army 
life imposed on them. __ They came from evf}rY walk of life and 
had every conceivable type of background. This alone would 
have pose-d vast problems, but the situation was further 
complicated by the fact that at the same time this tremendous 
expansion was going on technological advances in the making 
of war were growing by leaps and bounds. Because of these 
factors new positions of responsibll.ity were created and had 
to be filled without hesitation.. Because of the number of 
positions to be filled, the increased complexity of modern 
warfare, and the pressing need to. get the job done, the emphasis 
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in training people to fill these positions bad to be placed 
on the technological level. No longer could a man receive 
long courses in the various aspects of leadership. Trained 
men were needed immediately to fill the ever increasing number 
of new positions and as. a result instruction in leadership 
fell by the wayside.. A report to the Secretary of War presents 
this serious situation quite concisely: 
In most instances poor leadership resulted from 
the thrusting into positions of authority, men who 
were ~erently unqualified or were inadequately 
trained as leaders. This was brought about by the 
rapid expansion called for by the national emergency .. 
There were errors 1n select ion. Orientation and 
indoctrination were inadequate. Training was abbre-
viated& All of this resulted in failure to emphasize 
the importance of morale~ efficient personnel manage-
ment and respons1bilities.,2 
So far we have seen how World War II destroyed the 
homogeneity of the Army by mass induction of civilians with 
widely divergent backgrounds who were inducted if not against 
their will, at least with serious reservations about the Army. 
Secondly the gradual promotion system whereby a man was 
trained thoroughly and slowly in the skills of leadership had 
been destroyed because of the pressing demands of the war. 
Thirdly 1 because of the complexity of modern warfare there 
emerged the highly skilled teclm.ical NCO whose main claim to 
his rank was his ability to accomplish a tec!mical task.. All 
three of these innovations in the Army helped to bring about 
the loss of prestige to the NCO. But perhaps the most serious 
blow to the NCO corps came about because delegated authority 
to the NCO was gradually decreased to the point where initiative~ 
interest, and a sen~e of responsibility was all but snuffed 
out. Because of the rapid expansion of the Army, demands 
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for leaders increased9 In many cases the demands far outstripped 
the supply--or at least the supply system couldn't produce 
them fast enough--the result was that men were often forced 
into jobs tbat they were either unprepared to or incapable of 
handling~ When it became apparent that wrong decisions were 
being made at lower echelons, it became necessary to centralize 
control by means of rules and regulations that provided a 
ready made "sc;hool solution" .. for mani problems that would 
confront the lower echelons. More and more supervision of 
lower levels decreased the delegated powers of lower unit 
commanders who in turn decreased the authority of their NCO 1 s. 
Because many officers and NCO •s were marginal in the performance 
of their jobs, because of lack of training or ability, the 
NCO ceased to be the strong connecting link between the officer 
corps and the enlisted corps~ .As this centralization increased 
there was more and more officer supervision and in many fields 
officers simply took over functions that had formerly been 
accomplished by NCO's. 
Under the guise of war time security communications . 
to the enlisted personnel was held to a minimum. Quite often 
. there was justification in this lack of information being 
disseminated. However • because of the top-heavY centralization 
of control, information was often not given out because it 
was felt that the men simply did not need it.. Also the communica-
·tions channels had been badly disrupted by the rapid increase 
in the size of' the military establishment.. This is not to 
say that ef'f'orts to ilJ.fo:rm the m~n were not made. On the 
contrary in some respects more information was given to the 
enlisted man than prior to World War II. However, the way 
in which this inf'ormation was disseminated, mass lectures 
often by officers and movies such as, "Why we Fight" made 
under the direction of' higher echelons, circumvented the old 
I 
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channels of communications. Details of training and leadership 
that had formerly been handled by the NCO was now mass produced 
and the NCO more f'requently than not heard information for 
the first time along with the troops serving under him. 
During the war there arose a new breed of enlisted 
man called the technician.. He was highly trained to perform 
specialized technological tasks and as his proficiency 
increased he was advanced in rank. These specialists presented 
problems. that are still confronting our military leaders.. The 
question arose as to whether or not these specialists were 
really NCO's in the sense that they were the enlisted leaders. 
In more cases than not they held their rank not because of 
any particular leadership qualities they possessed~ but as a 
recognition of' proficiency in their field. The same held true 
for the officer corps, especially among those who held flying 
ratings. The net result was that because of the tremendous 
need for these people openings were more frequent than in the 
line organization and so not infrequently a specialist outranked 
the non-specialist NCO who was supposedly the top noncommissioned 
officer in the organization. · Such circumstances did not have 
to be common to further undermine the -morale and prestige 
of the NCO. 
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Almost without exception the problems mentioned were 
magnified in the Army Air Corps. Before the war the Air Corps 
had been an insignif-icant pa..rt ~f the Army~ · During and af'ter 
the war the Army Air.Force emerged as a major part of the 
Army. The Army Air Force had no history of its own to fall 
back on, the expansion in numb.ers had been more rapid tban any 
other branch of service, and the technological advancements 
staggering. Because of the technological basis of the Air 
Force it became top heavy with ranking technicians. In bomber 
squadrons men were often promoted to technical or even master 
sergeants whose main claim to their rank was they had survived 
twenty-five or fifty combat miss·ions and knew how to f'ire a 
machine gun. In the "old Armyn the NCO was something of a 
rarity. In the Air force of "1945 the private· was a rarity. 
'I . . . -
·' 
Applying the adage of familiarity breeds contempt, much prestige 
tor the NCO was destroyed. just becaus.e there were so many 
NCO 1s. In addition to their numbers, .the premium had been 
transferred from leadership qualities to technological 
proficiency. 
With the end of the war in 1945 a tremendous demobiliza-
tion program was started,· but the military was not to return. 
to the static easy-going situation of 1939. Modern warfare 
increased 1n complexity even after the fighting stopped and 
instead of retreating to its own shores as it had at the end 
of the first World War, the military forces of the United States 
assumed greater responsibilities for maintaining world peace 
than had any military force in history& 
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With the cessation of hostilities the common objective 
of defeating the enemy vanished~ . This common objective had 
been a mighty cohesive force that had made up for many of the 
ills that accompanied the rapid expansion and changing complex 
of the military. The United States Air Force, which had emerged 
as a separate service, found it had many of the same problems 
con£ront1ng it as had the other services. With the cohesive 
:force of a common enemy gone 1 the peace time Air Force dis-
covered that the quality of its NCO's left much to be desired. 
While there was still a need for highly trained specialists 
who had to be compensated for their skills 1n the form of 
rank,_ which meant more money, the Air Force discovered that 
it needed highly trained NCO's ~o administer, direct, and 
above all, lead the enlisted men. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER AS A LEADER 
The Changing Picture 
The serious problem of deficiencies in leadership, 
esprit~de-corps, sense of responsibility 1 and supervision 
of personnel was recognized by the Air Staff and major air 
commands. These deficiencies were attributed to the rapid 
expansion of the Air Force during World War II 1 followed 
by the rapid demobilization at the end of the war. The 
opportunity to select and train leaders during these years 
was negligible. The Air Force found that many of the recog-
nized leaders had no professional experience, and often no 
training, as military leaders.l 
The problem of what to do confronted Air Force leaders. 
There was little desire to return to the pre-war situation 
even if it had been possible. The post war Air Force was 
roughly five times larger than the Army of 1939 e Bases were 
spread all over the world instead of a few isolated camps 
mostly in the United States4 The mobility of personnel was 
much higher than it had been prior to the war.. The mission of 
the Air Force was different than the static mission of the 
Army in 1939. The complexity of the modern Air Force could 
hardly be compared to the p:re-war situation. Finally there 
was the problem of the great bulk of the people 1n the Air 
Force who were in service for one tour of duty in order to 
satisfy their military oJ;>ligation only, with no basis for 
common understanding as had existed 1n the Army prior to 
World War II .. 
The problem of adequately trained NCO's existed in 
a dollar and cents context as well ·as a human relations one, 
although they are not: necessarily mutually exclusive. The 
59 
.Air Force in dealing with one aspect of the problem felt cer-
tain that the other would either· be solved, or at least 
mitigated somewhat. In the pe.ace...:time era of 194.5-19.50 the 
Air Force was faced with ever increasing responsibilities 
and ever decreasing appropriations~ In order to fulfill the 
obligations of the Air Force mission, and stay within the 
budget, better management and better utilization of resources 
had to be realized. Accordingly military management courses 
were established in order to re-emphasize and teach the 
principles of supervision and management. Although these 
schools undoubtedly did much to alleviate some of the problems 
that faced the Air Force as far as managing men and resources, 
it was felt by Air Force commanders that something more than 
was offered by these courses was needed. Although these courses 
offered much needed help in the techniques of management, there 
was little emphasis in military leadership. 
One of the aspects of military life that seems to 
confound the uninitiated is the dependence placed upon rules 
and regulations. To the casual civilian observer it often 
appears that rules and regulations become ends in themselves 
in the military. Such is not the intent of the issuance of' 
regulations. Civilian industry often operates under a 
comparable set of organizational rules but because it is in 
the familiar conteXt of "free enterprisen these regulatory 
rules of civilian industry are accepted with little thought 
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to the impact they have on the. organizing of industry.. How-
ever, the Air Force discovered tbat you cannot legislate 
prestige or leadersh~p. Air Force Regulation 39-6 establishes 
policy relative to the responsibilities of the NCO. It also 
establishes policy to delegate to the NCO all authority 
necessary to exercise leadership and to provide advantages 
and prestige commensurate with the responsibilities that are 
supposed to be delegated under the same regulation. However, 
the NCO cannot participate effectively in the management of 
the Air Force unless he is placed in a position whicp. will 
permit full exercise of his capabilities. In other words 
you cannot legislate leadership or prestige, they must be 
earned and people must be given the opportunity to earn these 
desired qualities. 
The NCO vs. The Specialist 
When discussing the problems of the Air Force in 
regard to the NCO one must inevitably return to the problem 
of the specialist. This is a problem that is the basis for 
a thesis in itself. Although it is necessary to examine this 
problem 1 it shall be examined only to the extent t.hat the 
problem itself is understood. No attempt to solve this 
problem is intended. 
Because of the technological complexity of today 1 s 
Air Force many highly trained technicians are needed. In 
order to reward technical competence an airman technician is 
advanced in rank (and pay scale) as his competence increases 
and as openings occur. These technicians very often have 
very little real supervisory function. I'iore times than not 
they work by themselves or direct the technical work of a 
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very few subordinate technicians. Possibly because it was 
recognized that these people would not exercise superv.isory 
control to, any great degree, or possibly because of the imme-
diate need of trained technicians, these people are often lacking 
in anything that might be called tra1:o-1ng o.r experience in 
true command line capacity. Yet they have the rank of 
noncommissioned officers. Such a situation_ not only makes 
for very many ranking enlisted men, it reduces the possibility 
for recognition and prestige of the true supervisory NCO. 
This factor of too many NCO • s was rated as the number one 
cause for the lack of authority, ·responsibility, and prestige 
of the NCO 1n a study conducted- by the Air Command and Staff 
School of the Air Force.2 To cite one example of the number 
of NCO's, that is first three graders, 1n relation to the 
number of NCO's who actually had supervisory requirements, 
it was determined 1n the Strategic Air Command that of 3?,900 
first three graders autborized, only 9,000 were actually in 
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a supervisory capacity.3 It is not beyond reason to assume 
that this figure is representative of the entire Air Forceo 
Furthermore, it was determined that as of 31 October 1953 that 
roughly 30% of the total Air Force strength fell into the 
category of the first three pay grades, or NCO gradeso It 
is difficult to visualize a requirement for an NCO supervisor 
for every two airmen in the Air Force. Although the average 
airman may not be aware of the actual figures' he too realizes 
the situation is slightly ludicrous when he sees so many NCO's 
in the mess hall, in formations, or what is more important, 
when supposed NCO 's are given the same general treatment as 
the basic airman receives, except at the pay table. Such a 
situation certainly is not very conducive to the raising of 
the prestige of the NC09 
This fac~or of prestige is important for two reasons. 
If a man is not proud of what he is doing, if his prestige is 
low in the eyes of his contemporaries, he will not perform 
well and, what is equally important to the retention program. 
of the Air Force, he may elect ·to "change jobsP by getting 
out of the Air Force. The Air Force wants to minimize the 
loss of trained personnel because of the high cost of training 
competent personnel and because this constant turnover seriously 
interferes with the mission of the Air Force. 
The second reason is one that was discussed in the 
section dealing with the foreman; source credibility. This 
matter of prestige implies that this abstract quality is 
something akin to confidence and respect felt by one person 
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for another~ If the enlisted man has no respect or confidence 
in his NCO he is less likely to put much credence in the 
information that the NCO transmits to him. This lack of 
confidence 1n an information source is especially important 
in the military where rumor can do even more to disrupt morale 
and discipline than it can 1n civilian industry. Of course ·, -
the supreme test is in actual· war time where lack of confidence 
can have serious effects in the carrying out of orders issued 
by NCO's. 
Training For Leadership 
It was not too long after the war that the commanders 
of the Air Force realized that NCO corps was seriously lacking 
1n the leadership qualities that lead to effective utilization 
of the NCO and in prestige that was needed by the first line 
supervisor of the Air Force. The management courses that had 
been established certainly increased the technical efficiency 
of the NCO 1n the handling of his job according to good manage-
ment precepts, and these courses had a definite place in the 
training of NCO 1 s, but it was felt that a course which 
emphasized the human relations concept and helped establish 
leadership qualities was needed by the NCO~ 
At various times almost every base throughout the Air 
Force had established some_ sort of. a "leadership" course. 
Most of these had been of short duration and were largely 
ineffective for a number of reasons;·l~ck of a carefully 
thought out curriculum, lack of competent instructors, lack 
of subordinate unit cooperation1 and a general lack of 
interest. It was felt that a more carefully thought out 
plan 1 with complete backing at all levels, would do a great 
-deal to re-establish the NCO as a leader. 
It was felt by top echelon commanders that the 
establishing of a NCO Academy (NCOA) would properly fall in 
the purview of the Air University at Maxwell AFB, Alabama and 
accordingly the Air University instituted an extensive staff 
study in order to determine what type of program would be most 
suited to accomplishing the goals desired by the Air Force. 
Because of the comprehensive nature of such a study 
a good deal of time was consumed in background study and the 
problems associated with a plan of such magnitude also took 
their toll in time. The then commander of the strategic Air 
Commans, (SAC) General Curtis LeMay, felt that tlte nee_d was 
pressing enough that he ordered 1n January 1954, after pre-
liminary staff research, tbat the commander of each numbered 
Air Force in the Strategic Air Command, establish a NCOA 
within their respective commands with a target date of 
March 1, 1954. 
These commanders were not operating altogether in 
the dark. A prototype of what they felt was needed existed 
1n the }TCOA at West Drayton (United Kingdom) under the opera-
tional control -of the Seventh Air Division (SAC). This NCOA 
had begun operation in November 1952 on the proverbial shoe-
string and yet had achieved a very satisfactory record. Aimed 
at training the "top" NCO supervisor, this school, with only 
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a staff of two officers, seven instructors, and five airmen, 
had a training rate of 700 students per year. The curriculum 
was based on 162 hours of instruction and lasted four weeks. 
The initial phase of establishing a NCOA within each Air Force 
within SAC was based largely on the curriculum and methods 
employed at the NCOA in the Seventh Air Division. A. general 
breakdown of the curriculum was as follows: 
Personnel Management---------- 40 hours 
Leadership and Command-------- 40 hours 
General Subjects---------~---- 51 hours 
Miscellaneous----------------- 31 hours 
As experience was gained this curriculum in the 
NCOA 's conducted by SAC was expanded to the following ( tJ;le 
curriculum quoted is that used by the Eighth Air Force NCOA, 
Westover 1\.FB, Massachusetts. However, it is representative 
of the curriculum used by most existing NCOA 1s): 
Leadership 
Military Management . 
Classificatio~.& OJT 
Problem Solving 
Military Instructor Training 
Effective Expression 
World Situation 
Histo·ry & Organization of 
the Air Force . . 
Base Defense and Security 
Military Justice 
Safety•supervision 
Drill -~.d Colnrnand 
Physical Educ-ation 
Special Briefings· 
Guest Speakers 
Commandant •s Time 
Total-
26 bours 
16 hours 
10 hours 
7 hours 
16 hours 
29 hours 
14 hours 
6 hours 
10 hours 
7 hours 
· 3 hours 
.50 hours 
15 hours 
6 hours 
5 hours 
· 36 hour.§_ 
250 hours 
The net intent of the whole J>rogram, which lasts six 
weeks, is to give leadership .training, to give the NCO an 
understanding· of the human relations problems that he may 
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encounter, to teach the NCO bow to express himself and how 
to communicate more clearly, to give him an insight into why 
and how the Air Force operates, and to re-emphasize certain 
purely military aspects of his job. Throughout the whole 
course the NCO is indoctrinated with the idea of the responsi-
bility he possesses by virtue of his position as a leader of 
men and the prestige that will be his if he fulfills these 
responsibilities, 
While SAC was establishing their NCOA 1s, the Air Command 
and Staff study for a centralized NCOA was continuing. Although 
the Air University had much experience in the officer training 
field in their Squadron Officer School,. Field Officer course, 
and the Air War College, there was little basis for the estab-
lishment of a NCOA. In delving into the problem it soon became 
apparent that the major stumbling block to the establishment 
of a central NCOA would be the number of students that would 
have to be handled. With some 200,000 plus NCO's in the Air 
Force, training this number of people in an acceptable manner 
and in an acceptable period of time appeared to be impossible .. 
Selling Middle Command 
Because the need for improving the operational function 
of the NCO was so universally accepted in the Air Force very 
little active opposition existed among top commanders, and 
the NCO's themselves generally recognized the benefits they 
would derive from such a program. Unfortunately cooperation 
and understanding was not always so universal at intermediate 
echelons of commaild. Some of this lack of cooperation can 
be attributed to poor .communication in the "selling n of the 
idea to these intermediate commanders, generally at wing 
or squadron level, and some can be attributed to the fact 
that by filling quotas with their top NCO's the effectiveness 
of the unit was hampered somewhat while these top NCO ,·s were 
attending the NCOA's$ Then too there were cases where genuine 
misunderstanding took place. The assistant training officer 
of one of the NCOA 1 s operated by SAC reported that at the 
beginning of their operation they would occasionally get an 
NCO who obviously did not measure up to the standards set by 
the Air Forceo Upon interviewing the sub-standard NCO's 
unit commander it was discovered that the commander had sent 
the NCO to the academy to get "straightened out G" The NCO 1 a 
that fell into this category were immediately sent back to 
their organizations and the misinformed unit commander was 
advised that the purpose of the academy was not that of a 
correctional institution. 
It was determined at the very inception of the NCOA 
that the top NC0 1 s would be trained first for two reasons. 
Because they were in top supervisory positions it was felt 
that the need was most imperative in these sensitive areas. 
By training the top NCO's it was felt that not only would 
they be in the best position to transmit the results of their 
training to their subordinates, but their absence would allow 
the second in line to become familiar with their jobs. 
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Evaluating Tra~ing 
Most NCOA's have incorporated in their operational 
plans a method of follow-up to evaluate their training pro-
grams and to see what the NC0 1s themselves think of the 
program six months and a year afte.r graduation.. Unfortunately 
too little effort has been expended .in this area. Due to 
the fact that people get tran~?ferred, new unit commanders take· 
over, and the multitude of other problems peculiar to the Air 
Force, these programs have either been inconclusive or have 
broken down altogether. It is felt that this is a serious 
mistake.. Without any form of feedback ot'her tban casual 
observation it is felt that any .real evaluation of the 
effectiveness of.the NCOA is bound to be seriously hampered. 
The very people who are teaching the importance of' communica-
tions are failing to utilize one of the most important tools 
of communication. 
As a result of the NCOA's there have been established 
on many bases NCOA Graduate Associations. This is an excellent 
example o'f upward communications 1n the Air Force. While 
the organization, functions and scope of each Association 
varies, the ones:.existing 1n the Eighth Air Force (SAC) 
have standardized by~laws and the minutes of the meetings at 
each base are sent to Headquarters, Eighth Air Force. At 
Eighth Air Force Headquarters a Master Sergeant, who is the 
Secretary-Treasurer of the Association, has free access to 
the Commander of the Eighth Air Force, Maj. Gen. Walter C. 
Sweeney, and he is free to visit various bases within the 
command if there is a problem and help the council solve 
their problems. 
One of the main functions of the Association as it 
exists in the Eighth Air Force is to help in the selection 
of prospective candidates for the NCOA. By including 
top ranking NCO's on such selection boards a commander not · 
only evidences confidence in his NCO's~ but such visable 
confidence raises the morale of the NCO's and also raises 
his prestige in the eyes of his subordinates* 
One of the best ways to communicate is by actions* 
The very fact that the Air Force within its various commands 
has established these highly specialized academies ·to help 
and train the NCO has communicated to the NCO and airman 
alike the concern it feels for the NCO. The manner in which 
the schools have been conducted and the high caliber of instruc-
tion has established the academy as a prestige item in the 
eyes of the enlisted corps. Of course the Air Force hopes to 
accomplish many thirigs with these academies. Training the 
NCO to be a more effective leader is, of course, not the 
least of these goals. However, by training the NCO so that 
he may act as .. a better leader there is also the hope that 
the younger airmen will be influenced by the improved. leader-
ship and also see the· opportunities· offered him by an Air 
Force career. By tralliing the NCO in leadership and other 
human relations techniques there is a better possibility that 
the NCO will become someone who the young airman will respect 
and t~y to emmulate9 This is also good internal public relations. 
Other Communication Problems Of The NC-o 
All too often commanders are too aloof from their 
men. This is not to_ imply that squadron commanders should 
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sit around and "shoot tl;le breeze n with the boys 1n the orderly 
room. In the first place he is too busy and in the second 
place such familiarity does not help military discipline. 
However, he should not be so aloof that he is unknown.. To 
anyone who bas been 1n the service the omnipresent bulletin 
board is all too well known. In fact commanders place 
entirely too much emphasis on this particular method of 
communicating~ Not only is the bulletin board cold and 
impersonal, so are the messages. In the first section refer-
ence-was made to the language of efficiency.4 For some reason 
official informational messages that are supposed to communicate 
are written in such obscure jargon that often the average 
enlisted man is forced to either hazard a guess at what the 
information is supposed to be, a highly dangerous procedure, 
or retreat to the orderly room and ask. the first sergeant 
what the bulletin means. If the NCO doesn't know exactly 
what the message means, communications has broken down and 
the NCO 1 s prestige has taken a drop 1n the eyes of the airman .. 
Too much dependence on directives and messages obviates the 
importance of the face to face-contact. 
The conference method so successfully employed by 
industry should be given wider use in the Air Force. By such 
methods better understanding of the task to be accomplished 
could very possibly be obtained, and what is equally important, 
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the !!!.!l of the reason for accomplishing the task.. It is no 
longer feasible to tell airmen, "do what you are told and 
don't ask questions.'' To do this is to ignore the wealth of· 
human relations informat.ion that has been built up over the 
last quarter of a century. By ignoring the human element the 
problems of NCO prestige, morale, and retention of skilled 
personnel in the Air Force will only be aggravated. 
One line of thinking that still persists 1n the Air 
Force that could stand careful scrutiny is the idea that 
because it is a military organization that certain practices 
that have been highly successful in industry could not be 
applied in the Air ForceQ The Air Force today is a far cry 
from the .Army of World War I where the NCO was primarily a 
combat leader. In the complex modern Air Force productivity 
is more often the criteria of success than the ability to lead 
men in combat. Of course the NCO should possess certain 
combative skills, but the concept of the NCO as a leader 
whose men .will follow him up over a hill in a mass charge 
should be discarded. The operation of the great mass of the 
Air Force becomes more and more like a huge industry everyday. 
Since it is so nearly like an industry, why not treat it as 
such? 
The NCO of today 1 s Air Force is asked to be both a 
manager like his civilian counterpart and yet·he is expected 
to maintain an c:tura of the military. The net result is not 
impossible, but it is difficult. The NCO should get as much 
help as can possibly be afforded h1m4 Possibly the greatest 
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help that can be given him, other than the formal tra.ining 
offered by the NCOA, is to keep him informed. Unfortunately 
this is not always done. Like ~s civilian counterpart, the 
foreman, the NCO is told that he is a part of "management" and 
yet he is too often treated like one of the "indians" instead 
of a "chief.," It is an all too common experience to see 
master and technical sergeants standing in formation and 
getting "the word" from the squadron or wing commander. If 
these leaders are informed at the same time and in the same 
manner as the enJ.isted man to whom will the enlisted man turn 
to have his questions asked? There is only one solution. If 
the NCO is to be considered as a part of the "management team'' 
and act as part of that team, he must be treated as an integral 
part of that teame 
The concept of the NCO as a leader is, of cour~e, 
an important one. However, because of his direct dealings 
with the enlisted men he also becomes an important source of 
information for his commanding officer. Surveys, although 
they have their special use, never can surplant the direct, 
instantaneous feedback that occurs when .one man talks to 
another. The NCO is the logical person to transmit information 
both up and down the chain of command. Unfortunately the Air 
Force has all too often made the same mistake that civilian 
management has made in thinking tha.t what comes from the top 
is always more important than what comes from the bottom of 
the organization. With this basic concept firmly entrenched, 
saying that communications is a two way street is to be less 
than truthful. 
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The Problem Of Middle Command 
As in industry the success or failure of any program 
depends on the section called middle management.. Brilliant 
conceptualizing at the top becomes useless if middle manage-
ment is adversely or lethargically inclined toward the program. 
The squadron commander who sent one of his less desirable 
NCO 1 s to the NCOA to get ristraightened outJt is a good example 
of middle management mis-using a good program so that its 
intent is completely circumvented. While the NCO is being 
trained 1n the techniques of human relations it might be a 
good idea to re-examine the middle management of the Air Force 
to see that they too understand these problems of dealing 
with humans. It is noted with considerable interest that the 
curriculum of the Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs 
emphasizes human relations to the extent that nearly 50% of 
the curriculum is devoted to the field of human relations. 
Utilizing the NCO effectively in the role that is 
traditionally and rightfully his implies two things. He must 
be trained so that he understands the requirements of his job 
so he ~ fulfill these requirements and his superior also 
must understand the role of' the NCO so that he will be allowed 
to fulfill these requirements~ Neither of these steps are 
simple. It will take a great deal of training, research, and 
above all, patience •. The problem has been recognized, an 
important step in any public relations program, and the first 
step has been taken. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION$ 
Although there are many striking similarities in 
comparing the foreman and the NCO, in fairness one important 
difference should be po~ted out. There is a necessity for 
obedience to command in the military that simply does not 
exist in the same degree in civilian industry. However, it 
is not felt that this shoul.d not seriously interfere wi~h a 
program of communications and internal public relations, 
utilizing the NCO as an integral part of such a program, if 
this peculiarity is recognized. Both positions involve the 
supervision of other men and both positions are in the penubra 
of management. It is important to effectively utilize these 
two positions in order to get things done and done harmoniously. 
Although both civilian management and the military offer 
fringe benefits that make it economieally undesirable for the 
worker to change jobs, the economic picture of our nation 
is such that changing jobs is simpler now tba.n it has ever 
been. It is felt that by using the foreman and the NCO as 
communicators and agents of internal public relati.ons that more 
efficient and harmonious relations between management and the 
worker ean be achieved. 
Selection of Supervisors 
Industry has discovered that mere technical skill, 
alth~k impo~tant, should not and cannot be the sole basis 
for selecting a man for a supervisory position. Accordingly 
various rating systems have been devised whereby the prospective 
supervisors forecast capabilities can be analyzed. This 
rating system might be referred to as the forecast "growth 
potential" of the man about to be moved into the ranks of 
management. The realizations that the foreman is not just a 
"straw boss" but a person who must deal effectively with other 
humans so as to engineer harmonious cooperation has made the 
selection of the foreman extremely important in civilian . 
industry. This is not to say that all foremen in everz civilian 
concern is so carefully selected, but this is the trend. 
The selection of noncommissioned officers in the Air 
Force has followed the trend toward more care in the selection 
of new NCO's. Tecbnical skill is still considered as paramount 
along with "time-in-grade" (comparable to seniority). When 
a man is considered for promotion in the Air Force a promotion 
board meets and qualities of the man other than the basic 
qualifications dictated by regulation are discussed. This 
is not too dissimilar to.the evaluation of prospective foremen 
by general foremen. Unfortunately these discussions can be 
highly subjective; civilian industry by utilizing scientific 
tests to aid in the selection of their foremen have outstripped 
the Air Force in this categorya -In all too many cases men 
have been promoted to the NCO ranks by merely getting so 
much time-in-grade tbat they 11have to u be promoted.. Such a 
system is less than satisfactory. 
Training The Supervisor 
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Examples of how industry gives formal training courses 
to the prospective supervisor. to the new supervisor, to help 
him over the rough "break.ing=in" period, and refresher courses 
to the older supervisors have been given. All of these courses 
stress human relations, communicating with the worker, and 
engineering the consent of the workers. Generally speaking 
technical training and humanized managerial training is a 
continuing thing in civilian industry. 
The training of the NCO in the Air Force does not have 
such a formal setting, and again the emphasis is largely 
devoted to the technical aspect of the job. The two main 
formal courses offered to the NCO supervisor are the Supervisor's 
Management course and the NC.OA. Although a good proportion of 
the course content of the NCOA is devoted to the human relations 
field, very little emphasis is placed on the human aspect of 
management. 
The training of the young NCO is left pretty much to 
chance.. A1 though the results of the NCOA apparently have 
been quite satisfactory, this training is designed for the 
noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC)--the top NCO's in 
the Air Force. It is true that these trained men are supposed 
to indoctrinate their subordinate NCO's with information they 
have received at the NCOA, but this can hardly be compared to 
actually attending the academy. 
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Part of the study cond~cted by th~ Air Command and 
Staff at Maxwell Air Force Base in 1954 discussed whether the 
. . . . 
new NCO or tb.e top NCO 1 s should first attend the NCO Academy. 
It was felt by this group that the top NCO ts should attend the 
school first, and such has been the policies of the individual 
command t i3 academies. This leaves the new NCO to shift for 
himself. It is felt that a short co~rse, standardized and 
conducted at base level, similar to the nvest ibule 11 courses 
conducted by General Ele.ctric might prove to be of great help 
. to the new NCO. 
Mention has been made that the NCO Academies have 
rtapparently" been successful.. A vigorous follow-up program 
would. determine how effectively the training given to these 
men is ·being utilized by their commanders and also give a 
better basis for revising course content. Feedback is lacking 
and needs to be injected into this otherwise excellent 
training program. 
Other Help Given The Supervisor 
Other than careful selection and training of the 
supervisor 1 the two biggest factors in the effectiveness of 
the supervisor, both civilian and military, in the area of 
communications and public relations is the cooperation of 
middle management and for management to do more listening and 
less talking. 
As this paper has attempted to point out, all of the 
attempts of top level managemeritand commanders to establish 
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good ~ter.nal communications and public relations through 
well trained superviso~s can be brought to a virtual standstill 
if mi~dle management is not sold on the programs and techniques 
taught to the supervisors.. Unfortunately there is much 
evidence that in many instances middle management ·is less 
helpful than it might be. During the course of the research 
phase of this thesis a public relations director for a large 
New England company pointed out that all of the training given 
to their supervisors seemed to be having practically no results 
in one of their departments. Careful study of the situation 
proved that the general foreman was an ttold timertt who thought 
that all of this 11publ1c relations stuff''' was a lot of "bunk. tt 
Similar instances of the middle management block was discovered 
when interviewing the director of one of the NCO Academie~ 
conducted by thf?. Air Force. He told of a master sergeant, who 
had been one of their outstanding students, who upon the :return 
to his squadron was told by his squadron commander, "Well, 
you've had a nice six weeks vacation. Now let's get back to 
work. n Such an attitude on the part of middle management is 
demoralizing and very effective in destroying internal public 
relations or any urge to communicate upward. 
The "Two-way street" .of communications 1n the Air Force 
is less of a reality than in civilian industry, although in 
both cases there is much to be desired. In both cases the 
supa rvisor is relegated in all too man.y cases to being an 
instrument of communications downward only. There is much to 
indicate that top management still believes implicitly that 
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what they have to say is infinitely more important than what 
the worker or the airmail bas. to say.· Consequently management 
... 
often talks 1n the dark because they have not paused to listen 
to what those on the bottom ba ve to say. Without any feedback 
on which to base their communications. programs, management often 
makes serious mistakes 1n dealing with the worker. 
In comni.unicat ing with the worker industry seemingly 
makes better use of their foremen than the Air Force does o~ 
its NCO •s. This may be because civilian industry has had a 
consio.erable start on .the Air Force in training their super:-
visors 1n public relations and communications techniques~ · 
There is evidence that confidence in the ability of the 
NC0 1 s has contributed to this situation. However, the Air 
Force· still relies to a great extent on the direct, or command, 
type of communications in the form of the bulletin board, mass 
meetings, and commander's call for imparting information. This 
type of communications by-passes the NCO completely. 
The Treatment Of The Two S~ rvisors 
As a result of World war II and the de-militarizing 
of the military tbat was popular immediately after the war, 
the NCO came to be treated less and less as part of "management." 
Although he has not progressed back to the point he held before 
the war, steps leading in this direction have been taken. 
Confidence 1n the NCO ·must be given by the commanders and earned 
by the NCO. one cannot precede the other, they are simultaneous. 
The foreman on the other hand has been told over and 
over again that he is part of management. However, the figures 
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quoted in tP~S study indicate that the foreman is not 
. . 
convinced., However he is, on the whole, actually treated 
more as a part of management. There are i:nany reasons for this. 
The physical distinction of uniform is more evident in the 
Air Force than is commonly found in industry.. The 11social 
caste•• of the pre-war Army, while generally not found in the 
Air Force still manages to exist in modified forms, and 
management iS actually "forcedtt to use every public relations 
and communications tool at its command in the highly competitive 
labor field. With the tremendous loss of highly -trained ~en 
every year, the Air Force is also being forced to compete for 
people. Because of this competition and the necessity for 
highly economical operations due to limited budgets, the Air 
Force is beginning to make important strides towards more 
effective use of their personnel in both the technological 
and human relations fields .. 
Goals of Both 
Other than the more material objectives of modern in-
. . 
dustry such as jobs, products, return on capital, and wages, 
industry is interested in the harmonious cooperation between 
management and the workere From the viewpoint of management 
this tends to pr-oduce a healthy working background which in 
turn helps to increase the material resultants. 
There is no question_as to what the object of the Air 
Force is: national security. Although it may seem a little 
strange to speak of this as a produc_t, that is exactly what 
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it ise As a res_ult of this endeavor jobs are provided~ wages 
are paid, and, in a sense, the peace of mind might be compared 
to the return on the capital invested. Up until recently a 
' 
soldier has been looked upon as ~omething apart from the 
11 ordinary" p.ersone He was different and as such the rules 
of ~tnormal" society didn't always apply to him. It is doubtful 
if·this was ever a valid stand. Certainly it is most difficult 
'to dei'end such a position today. Harmonious co ope rat ion is 
another term for morale., a term with which the soldier bas 
·long been familiar. A century 9r two ago if a soldier had 
a little food6 a fire., a little rum, and a stout pair of shoes 
his morale was reasonably high. Today•s soldier is accustomed 
to more and wants more., The service life is more complex, 
he iS more complex, and dealing with him is more complex. It 
is evident that the Air Force bas . been dealing with the modern 
airman in a manner that leaves something to be desired. It is 
estimated that every year roughly 80% of the highly trained 
specialists in the Air Force have to be replaced. They simply 
are not staying in the service. This is the major internal 
problems of the Air Force today. It is not suggested that 
good communications and internal public relations will solve 
the problem. In such a complex problem there is no touchstone, 
no ~ answer.. However, by taking advantage of the knowledge 
gained by scientists and industry in the human use of hum~ 
beings, and by utilizing the tools they have, the foreman, 
the noncommissioned officer, as communicators and internal 
public relations people, it is felt that a step in the right 
direction will have been taken •. ·. 
--
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